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SUMMARY: 
 
► One study investigated asymmetric dominance effects in games. In individual 
decision making, when an agent chooses between alternatives x and y, the 
availability of a third alternative z, to which the agent strictly prefers x but not y, 
tends to increase the agent's preference for x. We showed that an analogous 
phenomenon occurs in strategy selection in games in which one strategy strongly 
dominates a second but not a third. 
► A second study focuses on ambiguity aversion – a tendency for decision makers 
to prefer risks with known odds of success to ambiguous prospects in which the 
probabilities are unknown, the most familiar example of this phenomenon being 
Ellsberg's paradox. We have modelled this phenomenon in games (strategic 
ambiguity aversion) and shown that it influences the actions of players in a variety 
of games. 
► A third study focuses on overconfidence effects in chance-based and skill-based 
market entry games, designed to model decisions of entrepreneurs starting up new 
businesses. 
► A fourth study seeks to provide the first empirical evidence on the confidence 
heuristic and, more generally, to examine the communication of confidence in 
interpersonal exchanges of uncertain information when players are motivated to 
achieve mutually beneficial outcomes in pure coordination games. 
► A fifth and final study is devoted to testing recent theories of team reasoning, 
according to which decision makers are sometimes motivated by the common 
interests of a group, rather than their individual utilities, and the extent to which this 
is affected by their confidence that the other group members are also likely to be 
team reasoning. 
 
These research findings have potential implications for training commercial and 
political decision makers and advising government ministers, health care 
professionals, and others regarding the most effective ways of framing public 
information on issues such as vaccination and environmental protection.  
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Background 
Scant attention has been paid to the role of confidence in interactive decisions. This 
project was designed to clarify the nature, functions, and phenomena of confidence in 
the five areas of interactive decision making described below. Starting from a 
hypothesis, based on scattered evidence, that uncertainty is an aversive mental state 
that undermines decision confidence, we conducted several experiments. The project 
was intended as a contribution to behavioural decision making and psychological 
game theory. 
  
Market Entry Decisions  
A market-entry game (MEG) simulates business start-ups in competitive markets. 
Group members make repeated decisions to enter or not to enter a market and are 
told only the number of entrants on each round. The payoff structure resembles real-
world markets – diminishing payoffs with increasing numbers of entrants, net losses 
for some if market capacity is exceeded, and no profit or loss for non-entry. In 
experiments, the number of entrants converges quickly towards Nash equilibrium – the 
number for which none could have done better by staying out and none who stayed 
out could have done better by entering. This “rational” level of market entry evolves 
without communication among players, as if by magic, as Kahneman famously 
commented. 
  
In stark contrast, real-world business start-ups typically exceed market capacity, 
resulting in most new businesses failing within a few years. Camerer and Lovallo 
(1999) suggested that real-world over-entry may occur because payoffs depend partly 
on skill. They reported a MEG experiment in which, on some rounds, payoffs 
depended partly on players’ skill, as measured by a general-knowledge quiz, and on 
other rounds were determined randomly, as in a standard MEG. Excess entry 
occurred only on the skill-based rounds, suggesting that players, and real-world 
entrepreneurs, enter too frequently through overconfidence about their skill levels. 
  
We designed a MEG experiment to test this hypothesis more rigorously. We 
manipulated and measured confidence – which Camerer and Lovallo (1999) failed to 
do, thereby leaving their results open to alternative explanations. We distinguished 
between inflated self-evaluation relative to others (relative overconfidence) and 
inflated self-evaluation independent of interpersonal comparison (absolute 
overconfidence), a distinction ignored in standard measures of overconfidence, and 
we investigated their separate effects on entry decisions. 
  
The Confidence Heuristic According to Thomas and McFadyen’s (1995) confidence heuristic, when people 
communicate beliefs to one another, they tend to express degrees of confidence 
proportional to their degrees of certainty, and recipients tend to judge the reliability of 
the information according to the confidence with which it is expressed. Thomas and 
McFadyen proved that this heuristic permits efficient exchange of information between 
decision makers with common interests and implements optimal solutions in pure 
coordination games with incomplete information – in which players have coinciding 
interests, so they are motivated to coordinate their actions, but incomplete knowledge 
of the payoffs structure. The theory appears never to have been tested empirically, 
and we therefore designed two experiments to plug this gap. 
  
Team Reasoning 
Decision theory and game theory rest on an assumption of methodological 
individualism, according to which agents invariably act to maximize their individual 
expected utilities. But people may sometimes act to maximize the collective utility of 
their group. This is team reasoning, and a small body of literature focuses on its 
surprisingly radical implications (e.g., Bacharach, 1999, 2005; Sugden, 1993, 2005). In 
Bacharach’s stochastic theory, agents adopt team reasoning only if they are confident 
that other group members will do so also. 
  
Team reasoning involves collective preferences, which may not coincide with any 
group member’s individual preferences, and a special mode of reasoning from 
preferences to choices: first compute a profile of strategies that maximizes the payoff 
of the group; then, if this profile is unique, choose the corresponding strategy. 
Orthodox decision theory is a special case in which the group is a singleton. Theories 
of team reasoning elucidate phenomena such as payoff dominance.  
  
No one has provided experimental evidence for team reasoning nor even collective 
preferences. Our experiment sought evidence for both, using decision scenarios and 
games with significant cash payoffs. Our experimental games each had a unique Nash 
equilibrium and a unique out-of-equilibrium outcome maximizing the collective payoff. 
This experiment pitted orthodox game theory head-on against team reasoning. 
  
Asymmetric Dominance in Games 
When a person chooses between x and y, the availability of a third alternative z, to 
which the person strictly prefers x but not y, tends to increase the person’s preference 
for x. This is the asymmetric dominance effect (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982). For 
example, if a shopper is indifferent between a mobile phone x (cost £120, call charges 
15p per minute) and another y (cost £100, call charges 25p per minute), then the 
availability of z (cost £140, call charges 20p per minute) may cause the shopper to 
prefer x to y, because x is cheaper than z on both product attributes, whereas y is not. 
This effect persists even if the dominated alternative z is presented as a “phantom 
decoy”, like an unavailable item on a menu or catalogue.  
  We hypothesize that asymmetric dominance operates by bolstering confidence – one 
feels more confident choosing an option that is seen to be unambiguously better than 
something else. We showed how it might apply to games, and we carried out two 
experiments to investigate it. Player I always had a strategy strongly dominating one 
other – yielding a better payoff against every possible co-player strategy. We 
examined strategy choices when the dominated strategies were phantom decoys and 
when they were available for choice, compared to choices in a control condition with 
dominated strategies deleted. 
  
Strategic Ambiguity Aversion 
We identified a class of ambiguous games, in which players cannot assign meaningful 
probabilities to co-players’ strategies, and we explored a phenomenon that we called 
strategic ambiguity aversion – a tendency to prefer known-risk games (in which 
meaningful probabilities can be assigned) to ambiguous games. 
  
Individual-choice ambiguity aversion was discovered by Ellsberg (1961). Two urns are 
filled with red and black balls. Urn A contains 50 red and 50 black balls, Urn B an 
unknown ratio of 100 red and black balls. A decision maker chooses a colour and an 
urn, then draws a ball and wins a prize if it is the right colour. Most people strictly 
prefer the known-risk Urn A, irrespective of the chosen colour, even when they know 
the second-order probabilities of the ambiguous option – for example, when they do 
not know the ratio of red to black balls in Urn B but know that every possible ratio is 
equally likely.  
  
We modelled strategic ambiguity aversion following Harsanyi’s (1967-1968) technique 
for modelling incomplete information. We proposed a new interpretation of ambiguity 
aversion based on intolerance of uncertainty and loss of confidence, and we 
conducted an experiment designed to discover evidence for strategic ambiguity 
aversion and to test our interpretation of it. (We also performed an experiment using 
small Ellsberg urns to test an influential alternative theory, but we lack the space to 
discuss it here.) 
  
Objectives 
The project’s aim was to integrate ideas from behavioural economics and cognitive 
psychology through experiments on aspects of confidence in interactive decisions. We 
ran more experiments than planned, with over 700 participants, and we met and 
exceeded the following objectives. 
  
1.  To assess the role of overconfidence in market entry decisions, taking account of 
different types and measures of overconfidence. This was addressed through an 
experiment in which confidence was manipulated and measured in a market entry 
game and different measures of overconfidence were distinguished. 
  
2.  To test assumptions underlying the confidence heuristic, and to examine the 
communication of confidence in interactive decisions. This was addressed by developing an operational interpretation of the confidence heuristic and conducting 
two experiments on communication of confidence in pure coordination games with 
incomplete information. 
  
3.  To test key assumptions of the theory of team reasoning, seeking empirical 
evidence for collective preferences and team-reasoning decisions. This was 
addressed through an experiment on collective preferences in decision scenarios and 
team reasoning in dyadic games. 
  
4.  To examine the asymmetric dominance effect in strategic games, and to seek 
empirical evidence for hypothesized confidence effects underlying it. This was 
addressed by modelling asymmetric dominance in games and performing two 
experiments involving games with asymmetrically dominated strategies. 
  
5.  To seek evidence for strategic ambiguity aversion, and to examine the role of 
confidence in explaining it. This was addressed through the identification of a class of 
ambiguous games, the development of a formal model of strategic ambiguity aversion, 
and an experiment designed to seek evidence for it and for a confidence-based 
interpretation of it. 
  
Methods and Results 
The methods included theoretical developments and controlled experiments. 
Participants (subjects) were recruited via an on-line participant panel and were paid 
significant rewards (typically, between £5 and £15) according to payoffs earned in the 
experiment. Detailed methods and results varied between experiments, hence for 
clarity of exposition we have conjoined “methods” and “results” into one heading and 
grouped specific details under sub-headings below. 
  
Market Entry Decisions 
The 96 participants, assigned to 16-member groups, played 24 rounds of a MEG. To 
increase player involvement, motivation, and comprehension, we presented it as a 
simulation of 24 opportunities to open restaurants in small or large towns (depending 
on market capacities of 4 or 8). On every round, players rated their decision 
confidence on a 0–100 scale.  
  
On 12 random rounds, whenever market capacity was exceeded, winners and losers 
were selected randomly, and on 12 skill-based rounds, rankings on a quiz were used 
to select winners and losers when market capacity was exceeded. The quiz required 
participants to choose, from pairs of UK companies, which produced more profit the 
previous year. This was intended to have higher face validity as a measure of 
entrepreneurial skill, and hence more potential for manipulating confidence in the 
MEG, than general-knowledge quizzes used in previous research. 
  
We manipulated confidence before the MEG by showing the players examples of the 
types of questions they could expect in the quiz that would determine their rankings. We assigned participants randomly to easy or hard examples, as calibrated in a pilot 
study. The main quiz – the same for all participants – was moderately hard. Group 
size (fixed) and order effects (counterbalanced) were more rigorously controlled than 
in Camerer and Lovallo’s (1999) experiment. 
  
Results. The confidence manipulation shifted confidence significantly in the predicted 
direction. On skill-based rounds, entry decisions were significantly more frequent when 
confidence was high, providing independent corroboration of the overconfidence 
hypothesis and putting it on a firmer empirical foundation. Entry decisions on skill-
based rounds were better predicted by absolute than relative overconfidence, 
clarifying the overconfidence effect and the confusion arising from neglect of this 
distinction in measurements of overconfidence. 
  
The Confidence Heuristic 
First experiment. Working in dyads on a specially devised Police and Suspects game, 
56 participants attempted to determine which face, from an array of nine photographs, 
looked most like a suspect portrayed in an E-fit. On each of 16 trials, one participant 
was shown a good E-fit likeness of one of the faces, designed to induce high 
confidence and accuracy, while the other was shown a weak E-fit likeness of another 
face. Participants could not see each other’s E-fits but were allowed two minutes to 
discuss their E-fitsand decide which suspect to choose. We chose this task because of 
the notorious difficulty of expressing in words why one face resembles another. The 
strong likeness was given to one player on eight trials and to the other on the other 
eight. Each E-fit was shown once to Player I and once to Player II on different trials, 
enabling us to determine, with full control of extraneous factors associated with 
particular faces, the proportion of trials on which players with strong likenesses won 
the argument.  
  
Whenever both players chose the correct face, they received 40p each. Whenever 
they both chose the same incorrect face, they received 20p each. Whenever they 
chose different faces, neither received anything, even if one was right. These payoffs 
define a Hi–Lo type of pure coordination matching game. Players indicated on a 0–100 
scale how confident they felt that they had selected the correct face. We investigated 
the effects of the gender and individual differences such as assertiveness, need for 
cognition, need for closure, and overconfidence. 
  
Results: first experiment. Players disagreed on less than 8% of trials, and half the 
pairs always agreed. This was unsurprising, given the pure coordination payoff 
structure. The proportion of trials on which the player with the strong likeness 
persuaded the co-player to agree on the correct face was significantly higher than the 
proportion on which the player with the weak likeness persuaded the co-player to 
agree on the incorrect face. As far as we know, this is the first empirical evidence for 
the confidence heuristic. However, because players with weak likenesses were quite 
often persuasive, communication of confidence is evidently more complex than the 
heuristic implies, and other factors affect coordination under incomplete information.    
Second experiment. To cross-check the findings in a different domain, we replicated 
the first experiment using a size discrimination task. Each of 82 participants decided 
which of two shapes (e.g., squares, circles, diamonds) was closest in size to a similar 
target shape and discussed with a co-player which one to choose. For one player, the 
target fell midway between the two in size, generating low confidence, and for the 
other it was close to one of the shapes, generating high confidence and choice 
accuracy.  
  
Results: second experiment. The player with the stronger evidence persuaded the co-
player on 86% of trials, providing further evidence for the confidence heuristic and the 
ability of people to communicate and interpret confidence. 
  
Team Reasoning 
First part. To provide empirical evidence for collective preferences, 81 participants 
made ten decisions and rated their confidence, choosing in each case from a list of 
five options for assigning real monetary payoffs to themselves and an unidentified 
partner. Every decision was framed as a scenario designed to engage a social value 
orientation: (a) individualistic (maximizing own payoff), (b) altruistic (maximizing co-
player’s payoff), (c) equality-seeking (minimizing difference between own and co-
player’s payoff), (d) competitive (maximizing difference between own and co-player’s 
payoff), or (e) collective (maximizing joint payoff). Options (a) to (d) are social value 
orientations in the sense of van Lange (1999), and (e) is a team-reasoning orientation 
that (we proved) cannot be formulated within van Lange’s theory. 
  
Displayed below is one of the scenarios designed to engage collective preferences, 
with the collective option at c. In spite of the scenario framing, participants knew that 
the numbers represented pounds sterling for themselves and their partner and that 
one scenario would be chosen randomly for actual payments. 
  
Fund-raising 
You and other students collect funds for charity. In the first hour, you and your best 
friend each raise some money. Here is a list of the possible options: 
  
   You 
raise 
Friend 
raises 
Option a  £1  £7 
Option b  £3  £3 
Option c  £5  £6 
Option d  £6  £4 
Option e  £4  £1 
  
Which option do you prefer?  a     b     c     d     e     (circle one)  
  The response alternatives were invariably mutually exclusive; for example, a response 
satisfying the individualistic orientation (e.g., d above) did not maximize any of the 
other orientations.  
  
Results: first part. Preferences tended (weakly) to follow the social value orientations 
that the scenarios were designed to engage. Crucially, substantial proportions of 
decision makers chose the collective options (e.g., c above) in the two scenarios 
designed to engage collective preferences – 59% (Fund-raising) and 49% respectively 
– and much smaller proportions chose them in the other scenarios.  
  
Second part. This was designed to provide evidence for team reasoning. The same 
participants made one-off decisions in four 2 × 2 and five 3 × 3 games, each having a 
unique Nash equilibrium and a unique, out-of-equilibrium outcome that maximized the 
dyad’s collective payoff. In orthodox game theory, if a game has a unique Nash 
equilibrium, then rational players are bound to choose it, because only thus do they 
choose best replies to each other’s strategies. 
  
Below is a 3 × 3 game used in the experiment, with Nash equilibrium at (E, E) and 
team reasoning outcome at (C, C): 
  
      II 
      C  D  E 
  I 
C  3, 3  0, 0  0, 4 
D  0, 0  1, 1  1, 2 
E  4, 0  2, 1  2, 2 
  
We rotated rows and columns and presented games to players in different random 
orders. The payoffs represented pounds sterling and one game was selected 
randomly for cash rewards. 
  
Results: second part. In the 2 × 2 games, the percentages of team-reasoning strategy 
choices were 63%, 52%, 51%, and 53%. In the five 3 × 3 games, the percentages 
were 53%, 57%, 56%, 86%, and 54%. Thus, in every game in which team reasoning 
was pitted against Nash equilibrium, an absolute majority of players chose the team 
reasoning strategy. This provides strong evidence that team reasoning can influence 
decision making in certain games. Team reasoning predicted strategy choices more 
powerfully than orthodox game theory (Nash equilibrium). 
  
Asymmetric Dominance in Games 
Asymmetric dominance violates rational choice intuitively, but it is not immediately 
obvious why this is so. We proved that it violates Savage’s first axiom, a fundamental 
property of rational choice. We also performed two experiments on asymmetric 
dominance in games.  
  First experiment. We assigned 72 participants randomly to three treatment conditions 
in pairs. In the first, players made one-off decisions in twelve symmetric 3 × 3 games 
in which each player had one strategy strongly dominating one other, but the 
dominated strategies were phantom decoys, visible but unavailable for choice. The 
second treatment condition was similar, except that the dominated strategies were 
available for choice. In the third (control) condition, players made decisions in twelve 2 
× 2 games constructed by deleting the dominated row and column from each of the 3 
× 3 games. The first condition is strategically equivalent to the control, and any 
difference in behaviour between the two must be a context effect induced by the 
phantom decoy. Under standard game-theoretic knowledge and rationality 
assumptions, the second condition is also strategically equivalent, because strongly 
dominated strategies are inadmissible for rational players.  
  
One of the games is shown below. For both players, Strategy C dominates Strategy E. 
  
      II 
      C  D  E 
  I 
C  2, 2  4, 3  2, 1 
D  3, 4  1, 1  0, 3 
E  1, 2  3, 0  1, 1 
  
Rows and columns were rotated to control for positional effects, and the games were 
presented in a different random order to each participant.  
  
Results: first experiment. When the dominated strategy was available, only a handful 
of players ever chose it, providing reassurance that players understood the payoff 
matrices and the dominance relation. In line with our hypotheses, players chose 
dominant strategies more frequently – even when they dominated only phantom 
decoys – than in the control condition, where they did not dominate any strategies. 
However, the differences between these means were not quite significant, probably 
because of a ceiling effect in six of the 12 games. In the six games in which the 
strategy preferred by a majority in the 2 × 2 control condition was not the strategy 
arbitrarily chosen to dominate another strategy in the 3 × 3 extensions, the asymmetric 
dominance effect was statistically significant: the potentially dominant strategy was 
chosen by 25% in the control condition, 44% in the phantom dominance condition, and 
54% in the full dominance condition, and the differences between these percentages 
is highly significant. 
  
Second experiment. To provide more persuasive evidence, we replicated the 
experiment, starting with 12 new (asymmetric) 2 × 2 games without dominant 
strategies or pure-strategy equilibria. We generated 3 × 3 extensions by adding 
strategies asymmetrically dominated by the strategies that were predominantly 
dispreferred in a published experiment on choices in the 2 × 2 games (Rapoport, 
Guyer, & Gordon, 1976). One of the games is shown below – C dominates E for both 
players.   
      II 
      C  D  E 
I 
C  4, 3  1, 2  3, 2 
D  2, 1  3, 4  0, 0 
E  3, 3  0, 0  2, 2 
  
Rows, columns, and game presentation order were controlled as before. In this 
experiment, one participant serving as Player II throughout, was paired with each of 81 
Player I participants. Only Player I choices were analysed.  
  
Results: second experiment. Choices of potentially or actually dominant strategies 
across the three treatment conditions differed significantly in the hypothesized 
direction. The phantom decoy and full asymmetric dominance conditions did not differ 
significantly, but both of those conditions elicited significantly more C strategy choices 
than the control condition, in which it was not dominant. This confirms that asymmetric 
dominance can influence strategy choices in games, even when it is only a phantom 
decoy framing effect. The phenomenon is consistent with our confidence-bolstering 
interpretation. 
  
Strategic Ambiguity Aversion 
In the role of Player I, 195 participants played three 2 × 2, three 3 × 3, and three 4 × 4 
games presented as shown below. Five further participants served as Player II types. 
  
A 
      II 
      C  D 
I 
C  8, 4  0, 4 
D  0, 4  8, 4 
  
B                
      II        II 
      C  D        C  D 
I 
C  8, 4  0, 0        8, 0  0, 4 
D  0, 4  8, 0        0, 0  8, 4 
  
Player I participants first chose whether to play the known-risk version with a co-player 
from Group A, whose payoff function invariably showed Player II to be indifferent 
between strategies (having an identical expected payoff for any strategy choice), so 
that Player I could reasonably assign equal probabilities to Player II’s strategies, or 
with a co-player from Group B, containing two or more Player II types, each having a 
different dominant strategy that would obviously be chosen by that type. Half the 
participants were told that the Player II types in Group B were equally likely, and half 
that any distribution of Player II types was possible. Half the participants expected the outcomes to be known immediately, and half expected a week’s delay. We 
hypothesized that ambiguity aversion would be greater when a delay was anticipated, 
because the aversive effects of uncertainty would be expected to last longer. 
  
Results. Players chose known-risk games in 59% of cases, confirming a significant 
strategic ambiguity aversion effect. The effect was strongest (64%) for players 
presented with the most ambiguous Group B alternatives, without second-order 
probability (equal likelihood) information. In this condition, the effect was separately 
significant in seven of the nine games. In the delay conditions, players who knew that 
the ambiguous co-player types were equally likely were significantly less ambiguity-
averse than those who did not, an effect that we interpreted in terms of uncertainty 
avoidance and confidence loss. 
  
Activities 
Grant-funded Symposium 
We organized a one-day symposium on “Confidence in Interactive Decisions” at the 
University of Leicester on 1 July 2005. Some 30 people attended, and we invited and 
sponsored leading authorities from the UK, the US, and Europe.  
  
The three grant-holders each presented papers describing work on the project. The 
other keynote speakers were Nigel Harvey (University College London), Eldar Shafir 
(Princeton University), Robert Sugden (University of East Anglia), Karl Teigen 
(University of Oslo), Paul van Lange (Free University of Amsterdam), Mark van Vugt 
(University of Kent at Canterbury), and Daniel Zizzo (University of East Anglia). 
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Outputs 
Seven datasets have been created and offered to the Data Archive. Listed below are 
outputs to date.  
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Colman, A. M., & Pulford, B. D. (2005). Ambiguous games and strategic ambiguity 
aversion. In B. Kokinov (Ed.), Advances in cognitive economics: Proceedings of the 
international conference on cognitive economics, Sofia, August 5–8, 2005 (pp. 32–44). 
Sofia: NBU Press. 
  
Colman, A. M., Pulford, B. D., & Bolger, F. (2005). Asymmetric dominance and 
confidence in strategic interaction [Abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological 
Society, 13(2), 207. 
  
Colman, A. M., Pulford, B. D., & Bolger, F. (in preparation). Asymmetric dominance 
effects in dyadic experimental games.  
  
Colman, A. M., Pulford, B. D., & Park, J. R. (in preparation). Team reasoning: 
Experimental evidence. 
  
Park, J. R., & Colman, A. M. (under review). Team preferences in interactive decision 
making: Maximizing collective utility. (submitted to Theory and Decision)  
  
Pulford, B. D. (under review). Is luck on my side? Optimism, pessimism and ambiguity 
aversion. (submitted to Personality and Individual Differences)  
  
Pulford, B. D. & Colman, A. M. (under review). Ambiguous games: Evidence for 
strategic ambiguity aversion. (submitted to Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology)  
  
Pulford, B. D. & Colman, A. M. (under review). Size does not really matter: Ambiguity 
aversion in Ellsberg urns with few balls. (submitted to Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology) 
  
Pulford, B. D. & Colman, A. M. (in preparation). Testing the confidence heuristic.  
  
Pulford, B. D., & Colman, A. M. (2005). Testing the confidence heuristic: Are confident 
communicators more persuasive? [Abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological 
Society, 13(2), 160. 
  
Pulford, B. D. & Colman, A. M. (under review). Undermining Confidence: Uncertainty 
Intolerance and Ambiguity Aversion (submitted to Personality and Individual 
Differences) 
  
Impacts 
Both of our papers at the BPS Quinquennial Conference were press released, and 
there was some interest from the media. 
  
 Future Research Priorities 
All of the lines of research initiated by this project are well worth pursuing. We have 
made some significant discoveries, but much remains to be done. 
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Comment 
The budget was underspent by a few thousand pounds for the following reasons. (a) 
Lecturers budgeted to replace Dr Pulford were appointed after their planned start 
dates, and one left early. (b) After Dr Pulford moved to the University of Leicester in 
September 2004, money earmarked for commuting from Wolverhampton was 
unspent. (c) Two grant-holders attended the British Psychological Society’s Millennium 
Conference for only one day without residence instead of the full four-day duration. 
  
 